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Closing the gap
This report contains an assessment of the ability of the current structure of policing in England and Wales to provide protective services to a common standard in the future. It sets out an analysis of the current key issues on capability and capacity of protective services, the economics of policing and risks posed by organised criminality. It concludes that whilst Basic Command Unit (BCU) arrangements and neighbourhood policing provides a solid local platform for the future, the current 30 year old, 43 force structure of widely different sizes, and capabilities does not.
Title: Closing the gap - A review of 'fitness for purpose' of the current structure of policing in England & Wales.
Authors: HM Inspector Of Constabulary Denis O'Connor CBE, QPM
Number of pages: 114
Date published: September 2005
Availability: Download full report 
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Summary
The report points to a future policing environment characterised by:
Widespread enterprising organised criminality, proliferating international terrorism and domestic extremism
A premium on intelligence, expertise and smart use of capacity;
An increasingly risk concerned public and intrusive media.
Looking ahead the police service needs not only to deal effectively with volume crime, the current performance focus, but also be ready to tackle complex, volatile threats to individuals, neighbourhoods and businesses. This implies a major development in capability and to achieve this, changes must be made not only to the structure, but the whole configuration of policing at this level.
There will be a need for a more efficient, integrated operating platform above BCU level. The organisation of service delivery must be on a scale large enough to respond dynamically, but local enough to understand the diverse context within which it operates. This means significant rationalisation of the protective services and support processes to put them on a stronger more efficient footing. In turn this will place new demands on leadership, oversight and support from government.
This report presents a set of 5 options for change.
Considerations
National assessment of police organisational fitness
The findings are stark - very few forces assessed fully meet the required standard. It is also apparent that size matters: larger forces are likely to have much greater capability and resilience whilst smaller forces, in many cases, find it hard to provide the services to an acceptable standard. Forces with over 4000 officers, or 6000 staff, tended to meet the standard across the seven protective services measured, in that they demonstrated good reactive capability with a clear measure of proactive capacity. Forces below that size tended to fall someway short of the standard, with, in general, the smallest forces faring the least well.Intelligence disciplines need development
Intelligence was the aspect with the lowest scores, and greatest shortcomings, regardless of size of police force.Performance management should be extended to protective services
Performance management is currently geared toward reducing volume crimes, such as burglary. Protecting the public is at least as much about 'readiness to operate', as was evident in the response to the 7th July 2005 London bombings, as it is about conventional outcomes e.g. murder detection. Performance measurement of these services is weak nationally in comparison to volume crime.Organised crime poses a substantial threat
Activity on the ground suggests that the conventional approach, which points to organised crime being focussed in metropolitan areas, is incorrect. It is worrying that so many gaps exist in the knowledge of organised criminal enterprises and markets – without detailed, sophisticated analysis of this tier of criminality forces cannot target effectively those who pose the greatest risks to communities and the economy. There is good reason to believe that other risks, such as those posed by civil contingencies, terrorism and domestic extremism, are also widespread.Stakeholders have mixed views
Little work has been done on the way in which members of the public identify with police forces, although work undertaken for the National Reassurance Policing Project (2002) indicated that people identified strongly with a discrete neighbourhood, wanting an identifiable, named local officer. Some partners and local politicians identify with district/BCU level services, while a smaller, but important group, value links at the county/supra-county level. This suggests that public resistance to combining smaller forces can be abated, to some degree, by emphasising that local arrangements – i.e. at BCU and neighbourhood level – will not change.Creating a 21st Century service
The evidence gathered regarding capability of forces, criminal risk and economics is not definitive, but is strongly indicative. It is probably fair to assume that a detailed consideration of other protective services such as professional standards, would follow this pattern Whilst each of the strands have some significance in their own right, taken together they point to significant inadequacies in the present approach, which will not be remedied by the present organisation of policing.
One of the gaps this work has highlighted is the absence of a clear definition of what the purpose of policing below national level actually should be in the future and there is value in addressing this as part of this exercise. At the simplest level, three responsibilities of policing below the national level are evident:the development of local and neighbourhood policing
the provision of protective services to national standards
the organisation of affordable support and strategic development
Design considerations for restructuring
The existing 43 force structure is over 30 years old. It matches local government structures and has emphasised the need to drive down volume crime and provide local policing, with considerable success. But current scope and scale now act as constraints to improve protective services and the economics associated with them. In creating a structure that is fit for purpose the overall goal should be the creation of organisations that are large enough to provide a full suite of sustainable services, yet still small enough to be able to relate to local communities.
It would be possible to disaggregate certain functions - giving one force the role of investigating major crimes for two or three neighbours for example - but with the possible exception of counter-terrorism, this risks blurring important lines of accountability at a time when the service instead needs to take a clear, balanced view of the 'police mission'.
BCUs are the critical building blocks of both the current structure and a possible new arrangement. They deliver the vast bulk of everyday policing services and many are now sufficiently large and have secured co-terminosity such that they can be left largely intact during a move towards a more streamlined structure.
Particular design considerations around combinations of forces in whatever form they take includeSize – the review indicates minimum size of over 4000 police officers, but must be cognizant of the need to design-in resilience and spare capacity.
Mix of capability – any structural change must take account of the graded capability of potential 'partners' (i.e. forces that could be amalgamated or work more collaboratively) as indicated through both performance on volume crime and the Protective Services Review.
Criminal Markets – it is fundamental to understand the underlying criminal markets and context in which any new entity is to operate.
Geography – the scale and demography may require a measure of pragmatism in proposals for change.
Risk – it is essential that opportunities to reduce risk are maximised by considering current capability and consolidating to generate new strengths.
Co-terminosity – it is essential to consider established political and partners boundaries.
Identity – whilst accepting the local focus of public perception historical and natural boundaries should be maximised where possible.
A different configuration – not just a different structure
Structural adaptation is necessary, rather than simply desirable, but it will not in itself be sufficient. Complementing the work to identify design considerations, it is also clear that a different configuration is required (a combination of structure, processes and relationship developments) to enable affordable protective services to flourish without undermining existing strengths of local policing and local forces.Options for change
It is assumed that the status quo will not produce significant improvements that yield consistent delivery of protective services to national standard, even with an enhanced performance regime, stronger 'bottom-up' intelligence system and greater flexibility. The structural options that have been identified include:I. Collaboration
This option essentially preserves the status quo and supports the early work commenced by existing forces and authorities. However, the modest scale of collaboration to date, and the significant problems associated with it, such as governance and performance and accountability suggests that, at best, progress will be complex, slow and of limited impact.II. Lead force for specialist capabilities
In theory, and with funding, the 'lead force' concept offers possible progress, albeit it would have significant implications for smaller forces in relation to the control and direction of enquiries conducted within their own borders, changes that they would need to acknowledge.
At a practical level, there is a shortage of sufficient candidate forces immediately willing and capable of adopting this type of role. Even if there were, it would only address specific categories of crime and would be unlikely to overcome the more fundamental issues identified in our work to date.III. Lead regional force
Building upon existing infrastructure, processes and partnership arrangements, this option envisages one force within an ACPO region being resourced as a lead force to host the personnel, finance and logistics of the regional protective services requirements on behalf of the other forces in that region.IV. Federation of forces
Against an agreed framework, forces clearly below standard could self reform by contracting together to be served by a common set of protective services that could extend to the brigading of support services.
Local force areas would be preserved. Local policing (BCU etc) would remain local, decentralised and relatively independent. However, dissatisfaction with the status quo – a pre-requisite for major self reform – may be insufficient amongst some incumbents to provide the degree of leadership this option requires. Clarity of priorities, responsibilities and governance would be an enduring challenge. It therefore needs a considerable level of support and 'incentivisation' from the centre and would stand its best chance of success where a federation already contained a strong force that could nurture relatively quick progress.V. Strategic forces
This is the most radical option with forces being re-grouped against a framework of design considerations, such as: exceeding critical mass; criminality; and geography. Again local policing arrangements (BCU, etc) need not be disrupted whilst force level services are rationalised. A prescriptive reform approach could be initiated relatively quickly if a new executive and strategic authority were appointed at an early stage and a tight timescale was set.
Although the clearest and most business-like approach, it could be perceived by some to be most disruptive and least 'locally friendly'. This approach would require firm leadership, extensive support and national will.
Conclusions
Whilst size, scope and structure are not in any sense the only issues for the future of policing, they are extremely important. Put simply, when viewed from the context of the range of challenges and future threats now facing the service and the communities it polices, the 43 force structure is no longer fit for purpose. In the interests of the efficiency and effectiveness of policing it should change. Whilst some smaller forces do very well, and some larger forces less so, the conclusion is that below a certain size there simply is not a sufficient critical mass to provide the necessary sustainable level of protective services that the 21st century increasingly demands.
The strategic forces option offers the best business solution. It offers the best potential, within reasonable time-scales, of improving protective services and providing better value for money. However, it needs to be well supported and to be part of a strategy that reconfigures intelligence, performance and value for money to help enable the police service "to guard (all) my people" (the mission detailed on the Queen's Police Medal). A federal structure is the best alternative and could offer a degree of greater resilience, but may not offer a clear, decisive, durable solution. Both of these options would need appropriate accountability mechanisms at the local and strategic level. The lead force/lead regional force concepts could be initiated more rapidly, but will not deal well with the fundamental issues identified in this review.
Structural change requires a considered, realistic view about the time scales in which it can be achieved, and the evidence from the private sector is that mature leadership makes all the difference in planning, initiating and achieving benefits from merger and acquisition.
There is, in the author's view, nothing incompatible between a move towards a more strategic organisation and a concentration on delivering more responsive neighbourhood policing. Strong neighbourhood policing is essential to connect with the public and inform the work of protective services. A force which is big enough to deliver protection, but still small enough to identify with local communities, is an attractive one. Re-configuring for better protection of, and connection with, the public, needs to be seen as part of a package of police reform for this century.
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